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Abstract 
We investigate whether quality of care differs between public and private hospitals in England with 
data on 3.8 million publicly-funded patients receiving 133 planned (non-emergency) treatments in 393 
public and 190 private hospital sites. Private hospitals treat patients with fewer comorbidities and past 
hospitalisations. Controlling for observed patient characteristics and treatment type, private hospitals 
have fewer emergency readmissions. Conversely, after instrumenting the choice of hospital type by 
the difference in distances from the patient to the nearest public and the nearest private hospital, the 
effect of ownership is smaller and statistically insignificant. Similar results are obtained with coarsened 
exact matching. We also find no quality differences between hospitals specialising in planned 
treatments and other hospitals, nor between for-profit and not-for-profit private hospitals. Our results 
show the importance of controlling for unobserved patient heterogeneity when comparing quality of 
public and private hospitals.  
 
Keywords: ownership, hospital, quality, choice, distance, endogeneity.  
 
JEL:  C36, H44, I11, L33.  
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1 Introduction 
Countries differ in the mix of public and private providers treating publicly-funded patients (Barros 
and Siciliani, 2011). For example, in the USA 60% of hospitals are private not-for-profit, 20% are private 
for-profit, and 20% are public. In France 60% of hospitals are private. In Germany 30% are public, 35% 
are private not-for-profit and 35% are for-profit hospitals. In the Netherlands, all hospitals are private. 
In the United Kingdom and in Norway most hospitals are public, but an increasing proportion of 
publicly-funded patients are treated in private hospitals (Siciliani, Gravelle and Chalkley, 2017).   
 
Whether policy should encourage a particular type of hospital ownership is controversial (Pollock, 
2004; Leys and Toft, 2015) and depends, inter alia, on how hospital ownership affects quality of care. 
There are no clear-cut theoretical predictions about the effect of ownership on quality (Brekke et al, 
2014; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001; Sloan, 2000). Private hospitals have stronger incentives to contain 
costs and, if this increases their marginal profit from additional patients, they will be more willing to 
increase quality to attract more patients. But when demand is not responsive to quality or increasing 
quality has a high cost, private hospitals have a stronger incentive to skimp on quality. Public hospitals 
may also attract more altruistic workers with a stronger preference for quality (Lakdawalla and 
Philipson, 2006). 
 
We investigate whether there are differences in quality between public and private hospitals treating 
publicly-funded patients in England. We use data on 3.8 million publicly-funded patients receiving one 
of 133 types of planned (non-emergency) treatment in 393 NHS and 190 private hospital sites between 
April 2013 and February 2014. We measure hospital quality as the probability of an emergency 
readmission within 28 days of discharge.  
 
A key issue in the comparison of quality between public and private providers of planned care is that 
there may be unobserved differences in the morbidity of their patients because patients choose their 
provider and their choices may be affected by their morbidity. We deal with such unobserved 
heterogeneity in case-mix by using the difference between the distanceƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐĞ 
to the nearest public and private hospital as an instrument.  
  
We find that private providers treat a less severe observable case-mix with fewer co-morbidities and 
past emergency hospitalisations. Controlling for case-mix, OLS estimates suggest that private hospitals 
have an emergency readmission rate which is one third smaller than the 2.3% of NHS hospitals. But 
instrumental variable estimates show that the choice of provider type is endogenous and, when this 
is allowed for, there is no difference in quality between public and private hospitals. We obtain similar 
results when we use OLS and instrumental variables with a sample selected by coarsened exact 
matching. Our analysis suggests that controlling for a rich set of covariates is not sufficient to 
adequately account for differences in case-mix between public and private providers.   
 
Private providers can be for-profit or not-for-profit and the resulting differences in incentives might 
affect quality. We therefore also compare quality in public providers, private not-for-profit and private 
for-profit providers. Using differential distances between the three types of provider to instrument 
for the choice of provider type we again find that patient choice of provider type is endogenous.  After 
allowing for endogenous selection there is no difference in quality across the three types of provider.   
 
Some providers, known as treatment centres, specialise in a limited number of planned treatments. 
Since specialisation could affect quality and most treatment centres are private we therefore also 
compare quality across four types of provider: public non-treatment centres, public treatment 
centres, private non-treatment centres and private treatment centres. After instrumenting for choice 
of provider type with differential distances, we find no difference between public non-treatment 
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centres, private non-treatment centres, and private treatment centres but public treatment centres 
have higher emergency readmission rates. However, in our sample, there are only six public treatment 
centres, and their quality is not statistically different from that of private treatment centres.  
 
We also estimate the public versus private models on samples stratified by patient characteristics to 
examine if patient selection and the effect of ownership varies by type of patient. Stratifying patients 
by observable morbidity makes no difference to our results: after allowing for endogenous patient 
selection there is no difference in quality between private and public providers for high and low 
morbidity patients. When we split the sample by age or by deprivation, we find that there is no 
endogenous selection in the less deprived or younger samples and quality is higher in private 
providers. But in the more deprived or older samples there is selection, and private providers have 
worse quality.  
 
Finally, we estimate separate models for samples defined by type of treatment, rather than pooling 
all treatments. For non-diagnostic treatments there is endogenous selection and private providers had 
lower quality. For diagnostic treatments there is no endogenous selection and private providers had 
higher quality. We find that, in four of the five non-diagnostic procedures (non-trauma knee, cataract, 
hernia, non-trauma hip) with the highest proportion of private patients, there is evidence of 
endogenous selection and, once this is accounted for, there is no difference in quality between private 
and public providers.  
 
We make a number of contributions to the existing literature on the effect of hospital ownership. First, 
we use data from a period in which public and private hospitals were paid the same prospective price 
for a given treatment. Our results are therefore not confounded by differences in payment rules, and 
hence different financial incentives, for different types of hospital.   
 
Second, most previous studies focus on quality of emergency care and use mortality as a measure of 
quality.  We examine quality of planned care, which is as important as emergency care in terms of 
volume. 
 
Third, given that mortality is negligible for planned care provided by private hospitals in England, as 
well as in other OECD countries with relatively small private sectors, we use emergency readmissions 
to measure hospital quality. We use data on 133 different planned treatments, whereas previous 
studies have usually examined quality differences for a small number of specific treatments. This 
enables us to examine not only the overall effect of ownership on quality, but also whether the effects 
of ownership differ across types of treatment.  
 
Fourth, in addition to the comparisons of public and private hospitals and public versus private for-
profit versus private not-for-profit, we also examine whether public and private ownership has 
different effects for general hospitals and providers specialising in planned care.  
 
The following sub-sections provide, first, a theoretical model to explain why private hospitals could 
have higher or lower quality than public hospitals and, second, a short account of the mixed findings 
in the empirical literature. Section 2 describes the institutional background and the data. Section 3 
sets out the estimation strategy and Section 4 reports results. Section 5 concludes.  
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1.1 Theory  
We provide a theory model to illustrate why the effect of ownership on quality is indeterminate. The 
model is a simplified version of Brekke et al (2012). Since the focus is on ownership we assume that 
there is a single hospital choosing quality q and facing the demand function D(q) (Dc> 0).1  Profit is 
 
( ) [ ( )] ( ) ( )q p c q D q K qS                               (1) 
 
where p is the fixed tariff paid by the funder, not by the patient. ( )c q (cc > 0) is the unit cost of treating 
a patient and K(q) (Kc > 0) is the fixed cost of quality from investment in information technology, MRI 
scanners etc. Hospital staff also incur a non-monetary cost of effort ( )qI (Ic > 0). Hospitals are 
altruistic and care directly about quality. Altruism is captured by ( )b qD where D > 0 denotes the 
degree of altruism and ( )b q (bc > 0) is patient benefit. The hospital objective function is 
 
( ) ( ) ( )V q b q qD I GS   ,                                                      (2) 
 
where ɷ is the weight that the hospital puts on profit.2 We expect that not-for-profit private providers, 
say owned by charities, will place a lower weight on profit than for-profit private providers. Public 
hospitals subject to a profit constraint, even if just a requirement to break even, will also place a 
positive but lower weight on profit.  
 
The hospital chooses quality q to satisfy  
 
* * * *( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0V q b q q qD I GSc c c c    ,                                              (3) 
 
where     
* * * * * *( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )q p c q D q c q D q K qS c c c cª º   ¬ ¼ .                           (4) 
 
Quality is chosen so that the marginal monetary and non-monetary benefits, from higher revenues 
and patients benefits, are equal to the marginal monetary and non-monetary costs. The effect of the 
profit weight ɷ on quality is 
 
* * * *
* *
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
q q q b q
V q V q
S I D
G G
c c cw    cc ccw                     (5) 
 
with 
*( )V qcc  < 0 from the second order condition.   
 
Thus the effect of a greater weight on profit G  on quality q is in general indeterminate: it will depend 
on the relative magnitudes of the derivatives of the provider monetary and non-monetary cost 
function, and patient benefit function with respect to quality. It will also critically depend on the 
degree of altruism. If altruism is sufficiently high that marginal profit Sc(q*) is negative (see (3)), a 
                                                 
1 The results of the theory model are qualitatively similar if hospitals instead compete on quality (see Brekke et al, 2012). 
2 For example G could be the weight on profit resulting from internal bargaining within the hospital amongst owners, 
managers, and medical staff or it could arise because the hospital must earn some minimum profit so that G is the Lagrange 
multiplier on profit which is larger the higher is the required minimum profit. 
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greater weight on profit reduces quality.  If altruism is low, the marginal profit is positive (to offset the 
marginal effort cost) and a greater weight on profit leads the hospital to increase quality.3  
 
1.2 Related literature 
A systematic review of the US literature reports mixed results: whether for-profit (FP) hospitals 
provide higher quality, as measured by mortality rates and other adverse events, depends on the 
region, the data source and the period of analysis (Eggleston et al 2008).  For Australia, Jensen et al 
(2009) control for endogenous selection by employing a sample of patients with their first heart attack 
(AMI) who are likely to have no or limited choice of provider. They find that private hospitals have 
lower unplanned readmission and mortality rates. Milcent (2005) investigates differences in AMI 
mortality rates between public and private hospitals in France when public and private not-for-profit 
(NFP) hospitals were subject to a global budget and private FP hospitals were paid by fee-for-service. 
After controlling for differences in severity, public hospitals and private NFP ones have similar 
outcomes, but private FP hospitals have lower mortality rates. Lien et al, (2008) instrument the choice 
between Taiwanese NFP and FP hospitals with differential distance. They find that NFP hospitals have 
better quality and lower mortality for stroke and cardiac treatment. When endogeneity is not taken 
into account the estimated effect of NFP status is halved.  
 
Picone et al (2002) examine the effects of changes in ownership on quality. This approach allows for 
unobserved time-invariant provider effects but relies on covariates to control for casemix.  Shen 
(2002) also uses changes in ownership and argues that restricting the analysis to AMI patients reduces 
endogenous selection problems. Both studies find that hospitals that changed status from NFP to FP 
had lower quality (higher mortality). 
 
For England, three studies compare public hospitals with private treatment centres during periods in 
which public and private providers faced different payment regimes. Browne et al (2008) and Chard 
et al (2011) do not allow for unobserved patient selection but do have condition specific pre and post-
procedure health measures for five treatments.  Browne et al (2008) find that private treatment 
centres had greater improvements in functional status and quality of life for hip replacement but 
smaller improvements for hernia repair. Patients in private treatment centres had fewer post-
operative complications for knee replacement, hernia repair and cataracts. Chard et al (2011) report 
that treatment centres had higher quality for hip and knee and similar quality for varicose vein and 
hernia surgery. Perotin et al (2013) use a switching regression model to allow for endogenous choice 
of type of provider by patients having nine types of planned care in 2007. Despite finding 
heterogeneous effects of ownership on patient satisfaction depending on the treatment specialty, 
they also find no overall difference in patient satisfaction between public hospitals and private 
treatment centres, once the different effects are summed up.  
  
                                                 
3 Notice, by contrast, that the effect of greater altruism, at given weight on profit, is always to increase quality since
* *( ) / ( ) 0V q b qDc cw w  ! .    
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2 Data 
2.1 Institutional background 
The English National Health Service (NHS) is tax funded. There is a gatekeeping system: patients 
register with a general practice and must be referred to hospital for planned care by their general 
practitioner (GP). Patients do not pay for healthcare other than a small charge for prescriptions. 
Around 11% of the population have supplementary private healthcare insurance (The <ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ&ƵŶĚ ?
2014). 
 
Since April 2008, NHS patients have been able to choose any public or private hospital provider for 
planned treatment (Department of Health, 2007). Information on hospital quality and characteristics 
is publicly available, for example on the NHS Choices website (www.nhs.uk). Hospitals are paid per 
patient treated with a tariff based on national average costs with an adjustment for local input prices 
(Department of Health, 2002). The tariff varies by healthcare resource groups (HRGs), the English 
version of diagnosis related groups (DRGs).  Public and private hospitals receive the same HRG 
payment for treating NHS patients.  
 
NHS patients can be treated in the private sector either in private general hospitals or in Independent 
Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs) specialising in a limited set of procedures. There are also NHS 
treatment centres on NHS hospital sites (Bate et al, 2007). NHS and private treatment centres are paid 
the same HRG tariff as general hospitals.4  After the establishment of private sector treatment centres 
and relaxations of constraints on patient choice of provider there was a rapid increase in the 
proportion of NHS planned patients treated in private hospitals. For hip replacements, for example, 
the proportion increased from 3% in 2006 to 18% in 2011 (Arora et al, 2013). Overall, about 10% of 
NHS-funded planned treatments were carried out in private providers in the financial year 2013/14. 
Most private providers are for profit.  
 
Both NHS and private sector hospitals treating NHS patients are subject to quality regulation and 
inspection by the Care Quality Commission which publishes reports and quality ratings. The HRG 
prospective pricing regime ensures that providers which attract more patients by increasing quality 
will get more revenue. There are also direct financial incentives for quality (Meacock et al, 2014).  In 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ŝĨĂŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?ƐƚŽƚĂůĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇƌĞĂĚŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƌĂƚĞĞǆĐĞĞĚƐĂďĞnchmark agreed with the local 
NHS commissioning body they must bear the cost of the emergency readmissions above the 
threshold5 and are not paid for the index admissions (Department of Health, 2013).6  
 
2.2 Data sources 
We use administrative data from Hospital Episodes Statistics (HES) for the financial year April 2013 to 
March 2014. HES includes information for all publicly-funded inpatient care provided by NHS and 
private hospitals in England.   
 
We measure hospital quality of planned treatment by whether the patient had an emergency 
readmission to hospital within 28 days of discharge from the index planned procedure.7 Emergency 
readmissions to hospitals are a widely used measure of quality in the clinical and health economics 
                                                 
4 ISTCs were initially encouraged to enter the market by being offered favourable contracts. The aim was to reduce waiting 
times in certain planned procedures such as ophthalmology and orthopaedics (House of Commons Health Select Committee, 
2006; Cooper et al, 2016).   
5 The above penalizations apply regardless of whether the first hospital of treatment is public or private.   
6 Emergency readmissions for children under 4, maternity, childbirth, cancer and patients discharging against medical advice 
are excluded from the total readmission rate.    
7 We follow internatiŽŶĂůƵƐĂŐĞĂŶĚĂƉƉůǇƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ƉůĂŶŶĞĚ ?ƚŽall three of the admission types that HES labels as elective 
 ? “ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽĂĚŵŝƚĐŽƵůĚďĞƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŝŵĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂůĂĚŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ? ) ?
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literatures (Ashton et al 1997; Weissman et al 1999; Balla et al 2008; Billings et al 2012; Blunt et al 
2014) and are also used by as performance indicators by policy makers in the English NHS (Department 
of Health, 2011, 2012) and in the USA (Rosenthal, 2007). We follow NHS performance indicator 
methodology (HSCIC, 2013) and define emergency readmissions to exclude readmissions for repeated 
planned treatments such as cancer, chemotherapy, haemodialysis, but differ in including patients with 
an index planned day-case admission (82.5% of our sample).  
 
Most NHS and private organisations which provide hospital services are multi-site. We use the HES 
hospital identifier code to classify hospital sites as belonging to a public (NHS) or private organisation. 
We also further distinguish in some models between treatment centres and general providers using 
information provided by the NHS Digital Organisation Data Service.8,9 We assigned for-profit/not-for-
profit status to private providers using the Companies House register and supplementary web 
searches.   
 
HRGs are assigned to admissions via the Reference Costs Grouper tool.10 The HRG alphanumeric code 
has five characters, of which the first four define a given procedure or diagnosis (e.g. the code FZ18 is 
ƵƐĞĚĨŽƌ ‘/ŶŐƵŝŶĂů ?hŵďŝůŝĐĂůŽƌ&ĞŵŽƌĂů,ĞƌŶŝĂWƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ ? ) ?and the last character is a HRG-specific 
split used to differentiate further by patient age,  or by clinical severity based on complications, or by 
both.  We use the four digit HRG codes without the split, known as HRG root, to classify index planned 
admissions by procedure.11,12     
 
We restrict the sample to admissions for NHS funded patients13 where the index planned treatment 
(HRG) was carried out at least 30 times in each of four types of provider (NHS non-treatment centre, 
NHS treatment centre, private non-treatment centre, ISTC) in 2013. (Table A1 shows the distribution 
of hospital sites and patients by type of hospital). 
 
To control for patiĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĐĂƐĞ-mix and pre-operative severity we include the number of Elixhauser 
comorbidities (Elixhauser et al 1998), as well as the number of past emergency hospitalisations in the 
year before the index admission. We also control for the quality of primary care provided by the 
ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŐĞŶĞƌĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞǁŝƚŚĂĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇŵĞĂƐƵƌĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ
on 42 clinical indicators from the Quality and Outcomes Framework (Doran et al, 2006).  
 
We classify patients as living in a rural or urban area by the Office of National Statistics rurality 
classification of their Lower Super Output Area (LSOA)14 of residence. We attribute a measure of LSOA 
income deprivation based on the 2010 Indices of Multiple Deprivation (McLennan et al 2011) to 
patients. 
                                                 
8 See https://digital.nhs.uk/organisation-data-service/data-downloads/other-nhs for data on NHS hospital sites and 
https://digital.nhs.uk/organisation-data-service/data-downloads/non-nhs for data on private hospital sites. 
9 Unlike the US, most English private hospitals are owned by for-profit organizations. Out of 25 private organizations in our 
sample, only 6 are not-for-profit, and they treat just 11% of the private patients in our sample (1.21% of the entire sample). 
We therefore do not distinguish between for-profit and not-for-profit private providers in our main analysis. 
10 http://content.digital.nhs.uk/article/6226/HRG4-201415-Reference-Cost-Grouper?tabid=3 . 
11 We do not use the 5th character of the HRG code because some of the complications may results from poorer quality 
hospital care, and hospitals may also upcode patients as the tariff is higher for more complex cases (Doyle et al, 2017). We 
do not lose any useful information on morbidity contained in the 5th character as we include both age and pre-existing 
comorbidities in the covariates. 
12 ůů ƚŚĞ ,Z'Ɛ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵƉůĞ ŚĂǀĞ ĂŶ  ‘ŝŶǀĂƐŝǀĞ ? ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ĞǀĞŶ ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ŵĂǇ ďĞ ĚŝĂŐŶŽƐƚŝĐ ? /ŶǀĂƐŝǀĞ
diagnostic procedures may trigger an emergency readmission to hospital in case of incorrect execution or poor pre-, intra- 
or post-procedural care. 
13 There is no detailed data for privately funded patients in private providers.   
14 There were 32,482 LSOAs in England defined by 2001 Census boundaries. LSOAs have a mean population of 1,500 and are 
created to be homogeneous with respect to tenure and accommodation type.  The rural category includes areas classified 
as town and fringe, village, hamlet and isolated dwellings, while the urban category consists only of urban areas. See ONS 
(2004) for details. 
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Hospital locations are derived from their postcodes. We compute straight-line distances from the 
centroid of each patient ?s LSOA of residence to all hospitals providing NHS-funded planned hospital 
care in 2013/14. The distances are HRG-specific, so that, for example, the distances for hernia surgery 
patients (HRG root FZ18) are computed only to hospital sites performing hernia surgery.   
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3 Methods 
3.1 Model specification 
Our baseline specification for the effect of private ownership on hospital quality for planned care is 
the linear probability model 
 
 ij j i i i j i i i iR H HD G H D G [ Qc c        X ȕ ; ȕ ,   (6) 
 
where Rij is an indicator equal to one if patient i with a planned admission for treatment j is readmitted 
to any hospital as an emergency within 28 days of the discharge date of the index admission. The 
emergency readmission is triggered independently on which hospital the patient has been admitted 
first for the planned treatment. Hi  is an indicator equal to 1 if the index hospital is privately-owned;  
ɲj  is the fixed effect for HRG j.  Xi is a vector of patient characteristics. ]i  is unobserved severity and 
ʆi   is an i.i.d error. We use heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at HRG root level when 
estimating (6). 
 
Xi includes controls for patient age (in 20-year bands), gender, number of Elixhauser co-morbidities, 
number of emergency hospitalizations in the previous year, whether the patient lives in a rural area, 
was admitted as a day case, patient LSOA income deprivation, and ƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ'W practice quality 
score in 2012. Xi also includes the distance from the centroid of i ?Ɛ>^KŽĨƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞŶĞĂƌĞƐƚ
A&E department to allow for the possibility that if i feels unwell after her discharge from the index 
planned treatment, her decision to visit an A&E department, and hence possibly to be admitted as an 
emergency patient, will depend on her distance to the A&E department. 
 
The coefficient of interest is G: the difference in the probability of an emergency readmission following 
a planned treatment in a private hospital compared to an NHS hospital.  If G < 0, then there is higher 
quality of care in private hospitals.  
 
Privately-owned hospitals in England treat NHS patients of lower observed severity for a given 
condition (Browne et al 2008, Chard et al 2011, Mason et al 2010).  Selection on observed severity 
suggests that there may also be selection on unobserved severity ( )i]  so that Cov(Hi,]i |ɲj,Xi) z 0 and 
the OLS estimate of G  is biased. Such bias will occur if quality and other hospital characteristics affect 
ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ĐŚŽŝĐĞŽĨƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌĨŽƌƉůĂŶŶĞĚĐĂƌĞ ?ĞĐŬĞƌƚĞƚĂů  ? ? ? ? ?'ĂǇŶŽƌĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ?'ƵƚĂĐŬĞƌĞƚĂů
2016, Moscelli et al 2016a), patient preferences vary with their unobserved morbidity, and patients 
believe that quality or other hospital characteristics differ between public and private providers.   
 
To remove this potential bias we instrument for patient choice of provider type and use two stage 
least squares (2SLS).  The first stage linear regression for provider type is  
 
 i j ij i iH DD T Kc   X Ȗ ,  (7) 
 
where ɲj and Xi are the HRG effects and case-mix adjusters and Ki is a zero mean error term 
uncorrelated with the explanatories. The instrument Dij is the difference between the distance from 
ƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌŽŝĚŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ>^KƚŽƚŚĞŶĞĂƌĞƐƚE,^ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌof treatment j and the distance to the 
nearest private provider of treatment j. We use robust standard errors clustered on HRG roots for the 
first and second stage regressions.15 
 
                                                 
15 The 2SLS models are estimated in Stata 13 using the ivreg2 user written function (Baum et al, 2007). 
The effect of hospital ownership on quality of care: evidence from England  9 
 
Differential distance has been used as an instrument in the literature on the effectiveness of 
healthcare treatments (McClellan et al 1994, Newhouse and McClellan 1998) and the effect of hospital 
ownership on quality (Sloan et al 2001, Shen 2002, Lien 2008). Results from our first stage model show 
that it is indeed a strong predictor of the type of hospital at which a patient is treated.   
 
For our IV strategy to work, the instrument should affect the second stage outcome (emergency 
readmission) only indirectly through hospital type. There are good reasons to believe that this 
untestable assumption holds. First, differential distances are unlikely to have a direct effect on the 
probability of an emergency readmission to an NHS hospital. Distances to NHS hospitals may affect 
the probability that a patient, who is unsure if their symptoms indicate a condition requiring 
emergency hospital treatment, will make the journey or call an ambulance. We therefore include the 
ĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ>^KƚŽƚŚĞĐůŽƐĞƐƚNHS site with an A&E department as a covariate in Xi 
in both the emergency readmission model (6), whether estimated by OLS or 2SLS, and in the first stage 
selection model (7). The distance to private hospitals, which do not provide emergency care to NHS 
patients, will not affect the probability of an emergency admission to an NHS general hospital. Thus, 
conditional on the distance to the nearest NHS A&E department, the difference between the distances 
to the nearest NHS site and to the nearest private site, should not affect the decision to seek 
emergency care.   
 
Second, it seems implausible that ƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨƉůĂŶŶĞĚĐĂƌĞĂĨĨĞĐƚƐƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚǁŚĞƌĞƚŽ
live.16 This would require prospective patients to predict the kind of planned treatments that they 
would require in the medium-to-long term and the future quality of care at different providers for 
these different treatments. Aside from the fluctuations in the quality of hospital care over time, the 
quality of care for different planned treatments is weakly correlated within hospitals (Gravelle et al 
2014, Moscelli et al 2016b). Third, even if sicker patients might wish to locate near NHS hospitals with 
good quality emergency care (though we know of no evidence for this), the qualities of emergency 
and planned hospital care are also weakly correlated (Gravelle et al 2014, Moscelli et al 2016b). Fourth, 
we require only that the differential distance instrument is weakly exogenous, i.e. uncorrelated with 
the errors in the second stage readmission model conditional on the rich set of controls and HRG 
effects ( jD  and Xi) included in the readmission model.17 
 
Some unobserved selection might not arise from patient choice of provider, but from provider choice 
of patient. This may be unofficial and uncontracted for or it may be explicit and agreed with local NHS 
commissioners of care. Some contracts for private treatment centres contain exclusion clauses setting 
out the grounds on which a referred patient can be refused treatment by the private provider (Cooper 
et al, 2016; Mason et al 2008).18 The observed morbidity measures included in Xi will allow for some 
provider selection of patients but some unobserved (by the researcher) selection by providers may 
remain. The greater the degree of cream skimming the weaker will be our differential distance 
                                                 
16 We do not include patients with conditions like cancer or renal failure who may require many planned hospital admissions 
and so be more likely to locate near NHS providers.  Such patients are also dropped when official emergency readmissions 
performance indicators for NHS providers are computed:  
https://indicators.ic.nhs.uk/download/NCHOD/Specification/Spec_33D_533ISP4CPP1_12_V1.pdf  
17 Remarkably, the weak exogeneity assumption strengthens the plausibility of the exclusion restriction, as the differential 
distance IV needs to be uncorrelated with emergency readmissions just for the specific HRG jD , which the patient is treated 
for. It is unlikely that a patient will repeatedly change her residence according to the couple of NHS and private hospitals 
with lowest emergency readmissions rates for a specific treatment, unless in case of repeated planned treatments (e.g. 
chemotherapy, hemodialysis), which are excluded from our sample.  
18 For example, a tender for treatments by private treatment centres of patients of five Clinical Commissioning Groups in 
south west England specifies that the provider can exclude patients who had a Body Mass Index of over 40 or who require a 
general anaesthetic and have a severe systemic disease that is a risk to life, for example unstable angina, or a recent 
myocardial infarction.  
See  https://www.bristolccg.nhs.uk/media/medialibrary/2015/10/govbody_28april2015_item10_1.pdf  
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instrument. If our first stage results show that the instrument is not weak and the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test on the second stage does reject the null of exogeneity of type of provider, then we know 
that there has been unobserved selection of providers by patients. Comparison of the OLS and 2SLS 
coefficients on provider type will show whether, as we expect, unobservably sicker patients are more 
likely to choose public hospitals. The 2SLS estimate of the effect of private ownership may still be 
biased by unobserved patient selection by provider. However, we know the direction of this bias: 
provider selection of patients leaves private providers with unobservably healthier patients, and so 
will lead to an over-estimate of the quality gain from private treatment compared to public treatment. 
Thus, if our second stage estimates show that private providers are no better than public providers, 
we can reasonably conclude that public providers have at least as high quality as private providers. 
 
3.2 Matching  
Regression adjustment for observable case-mix differences between private and public hospitals may 
not be adequate in the presence of non-linearities or interaction effects, even if there is no 
unobserved selection. If private providers treat observably less severe patients, the lack of common 
support may bias estimates of the effect of ownership (Heckman et al, 1997) even in the absence of 
unobserved selection.   
 
We therefore use coarsened exact matching (CEM) (Blackwell 2009, Iacus, 2012) as a robustness 
check. We match each patient treated by a private provider to one or more patients treated in public 
hospitals who have the same gender, age band ?ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƉĂƐƚǇĞĂƌ ?ƐĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
number of Elixhauser comorbidities, quintile of the IMD 2010 income score, and the same four digit 
HRG4 code. We drop observations where the number of ƉĂƐƚǇĞĂƌ ?ƐĞŵĞƌŐĞŶcy hospitalizations and 
the number of Elixhauser comorbidities exceed 4.19 We then estimate the OLS and 2SLS models using 
weights provided by the CEM algorithm.  
 
3.3 Specialisation vs general; for profit vs not for profit 
Treatment centres specialise in a small number of HRG treatment types and account for a much larger 
proportion of NHS patients in private hospitals (46.4%) than in public hospitals (1.4%). Since 
specialisation in planned care may affect quality we estimate models which distinguish hospitals by 
whether they are treatment centres as well as by ownership  
 
                                                     ij j i i iR D Hc c   H į ; ș  ,            (8) 
 
where Hi is a vector of three indicators for the patient having an admission to an NHS treatment centre, 
a private non-treatment centre, or a private treatment centre. The reference type of hospital is an 
NHS general hospital (non-treatment centre). For the 2SLS specification we estimate three first stage 
regressions for choice of an NHS treatment centre, private non-treatment centre hospital, and private 
treatment centre. The instruments in each first stage model are the three differential distances 
between the closest NHS general hospital and the distances to each of the three other hospital types. 
The computed distance instruments are HRG-specific since not all hospitals offer the entire spectrum 
of planned care.    
 
Some of the private hospitals treating NHS patients are for profit and some are not for profit and 
previous studies in other healthcare systems have found that FP hospitals have lower quality (Sloan 
et 2001, Picone et al 2002, Shen 2002, Lien et al 2008). We therefore examine whether the FP status 
of private hospitals affects quality for the NHS patients they treat. We estimate a model similar to (8) 
                                                 
19 These variables were much more heavily right skewed in NHS hospitals than in private hospitals so that using a category 
of more than four comorbidities or previous admissions would match private patients to public patients with much higher 
mean counts. Using finer categories would not result in many matches.  
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in which public hospitals are the reference category and the alternatives are private NFP and private 
FP.   
 
3.4 Stratification by patient and procedure 
We also estimate models on subsamples defined by patient characteristics. By dichotomising the 
sample by morbidity, for example, we can investigate whether there is more evidence of unobserved 
selection for high or low morbidity patients and whether the effect of ownership differs by morbidity. 
To investigate whether the effect of ownership is procedure specific we estimate separate models for 
diagnostic and non-diagnostic procedures and procedure specific models for the HRG roots with the 
largest proportion of patients treated in private providers.  
 
Table 1. Patient descriptive statistics 
Panel A. Unmatched sample  
NHS  Private  
mean sd median  mean sd median 
28-days Emergency readmission 0.0226 0.15 0  0.0138 0.12 0 
        
Female patient 0.545 0.50 1  0.551 0.50 1 
Age 55.96 20.28 59  56.18 16.98 57 
Emergency hospitalizations past year 0.25 0.76 0  0.10 0.42 0 
Elixhauser comorbidities 0.68 0.97 0  0.67 0.89 0 
IMD 2010 income score 0.15 0.11 0.11  0.13 0.10 0.09 
GP QOF 2012 79.02 3.69 79.31  79.11 3.63 79.40 
Rural patient 0.184 0.39 0  0.214 0.41 0 
Daycase patient 0.854 0.35 1  0.697 0.46 1 
Distance to closest NHS non-TC hospital site (km) 6.82 6.38 4.65  7.81 6.92 5.54 
        
dNHS: Distance to closest NHS site (non-TC or TC) 6.77 6.32 4.64  7.78 6.90 5.53 
dP: Distance to closest Private site (non-TC or TC) 17.37 21.73 10.22  8.60 7.85 6.31 
dNHS - dP -10.61 20.72 -3.72  -0.82 7.16 -0.15 
N 3,407,820  376,863 
Panel B. Matched sample  
NHS  Private 
  mean sd median  mean sd median 
28-days Emergency readmission 0.0202 0.14 0  0.0137 0.12 0 
        
Female patient 0.550 0.50 1  0.551 0.50 1 
Age 56.39 17.15 57  56.18 16.96 57 
Emergency hospitalizations past year 0.10 0.45 0  0.09 0.41 0 
Elixhauser comorbidities 0.67 0.89 0  0.67 0.89 0 
IMD 2010 income score 0.13 0.10 0.09  0.13 0.10 0.09 
GP QOF 2012 79.04 3.64 79.32  79.11 3.63 79.40 
Rural patient 0.205 0.4 0  0.214 0.41 0 
Daycase patient 0.776 0.42 1  0.697 0.46 1 
Distance to closest NHS non-TC hospital site 7.14 6.54 4.95  7.80 6.92 5.54 
        
dNHS: Distance to closest NHS site (non-TC or TC) 7.08 6.49 4.92  7.78 6.89 5.53 
dP: Distance to closest Private site (non-TC or TC)   15.18 18.17 9.64  8.59 7.84 6.30 
dNHS - dP -8.10 17.08 -2.79  -0.82 7.16 -0.14 
N  3,105,647   375,526 
Notes. Patients in matched sample in Panel B are matched using a Coarsened Exact Matching algorithm based on the 
variables in italics, together with the 133 four digit HRG4 codes. Statistics in Panel B are computed using the CEM weights. 
Number of hospital sites: 148 private non-TC, 42 private TC, 387 NHS non-TC, 6 NHS TC. TC: treatment centre. 
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4 Results 
4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 1 has summary statistics by type of chosen hospital (NHS or private). Panel A is for the full 
sample. Although NHS and privately treated patients have similar mean age and gender, NHS treated 
patients had more emergency hospitalisations (0.25 vs 0.10) in the previous year, come from slightly 
more income-deprived (mean IMD-income score of 0.15 vs 0.13) and less rural small areas (18% vs 
21%), and are more frequently treated as a day-case. They have similar numbers of Elixhauser 
comorbidities and GP quality scores. NHS treated patients are on average located closer to the nearest 
NHS hospital site with an A&E department than patients in private hospitals, and are more likely 
(2.26% vs 1.38%) to undergo an emergency readmission to hospital within 28 days of discharge from 
the index admission. Notice that for patients in an NHS hospital the distance to the nearest NHS 
hospital is smaller than the distance to the nearest private provider and vice versa for patients in 
private providers.  
 
Panel B has descriptive statistics on the matched sample, after reweighting using the CEM algorithm 
weights.20 Matching greatly reduces the imbalance in covariates between the two patient groups. 
There also is a slight reduction in the unconditional probability of emergency readmissions after 
treatment for NHS patients, most likely because of the exclusion of NHS-treated patients with high 
severity who could not be matched to private sector patients.      
      
4.2 Estimation results 
Table 2 summarises the key results for the unmatched sample from OLS and 2SLS models of the effect 
on the probability of an emergency readmission of being treated in a private hospital. The full results, 
reported in the Appendix (Table A2), have plausible effects of the covariates: emergency readmission 
is more likely for older patients, those with more comorbidities, with more emergency admissions in 
the previous year, and living in a small area with higher income deprivation. Day-case patients are less 
likely to have an emergency readmission, suggesting that providers do have better information than 
is available in the HES data and are more likely to treat a patient as a day-case rather than an overnight 
stay if they are unobservably (by the researcher) healthier. Patients belonging to practices with higher 
quality also have lower readmission rates. Patients living further from the nearest general NHS 
hospital have lower emergency readmission probabilities, whether treated in a private or public 
provider. Patients in rural areas are also less likely to have an emergency readmission, perhaps 
reflecting the effects of travel costs, which are not fully captured by the straight line distance to the 
nearest NHS general hospital.  
 
In Table 2 the OLS estimate of the effect of private ownership after controlling for HRG type but not 
covariates is 0.0095 (column 1). Controlling for observed case-mix (column 2) reduces the estimated 
private ownership effect to 0.0070, which implies that patients treated in private providers have a 
one third lower emergency readmissions risk.   
 
The estimates of the effect of ownership change markedly when we instrument for choice of provider 
type (column 3). The first stage regression results in the lower part of the table show that the 
probability of choosing a private provider is higher the greater the difference in distance from the 
patient to the closest NHS hospital site and to the closest private hospital site. The first stage F-statistic 
on the instrument is 48.70, which is comfortably larger than the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical value 
of 16.38 for a type-1 error of 5% and a maximum 10% relative bias with respect to OLS. The Durbin-
                                                 
20 Only about 1,300 out of 295,000 patients excluded by the matching algorithm were treated in private hospitals. 
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Wu-Hausman test (Durbin 1954, Wu 1973, Hausman 1978) rejects the null hypothesis that hospital 
ownership is exogenous (p<0.001).  
 
The second stage estimate of the effect of being treated by a private hospital on the probability of an 
emergency readmission is positive and statistically insignificant, whereas the OLS estimate was 
negative and statistically significant. Moreover, the 99% confidence interval around the 2SLS estimate 
of G is [-0.0028; 0.0085], which does not include the OLS estimate. 
 
We obtain similar 2SLS results when the instruments are the distances to the nearest NHS and nearest 
private hospital (column 4), the proportional differential distance (column 5), and the proportional 
distances to the nearest NHS and nearest private hospital (column 6).21 The 2SLS estimates of the 
effect of private ownership on probability of emergency admission range from 0.0028 to 0.0044 and 
are all statistically insignificant.     
 
Table 2. Effect of ownership on emergency readmissions 
 
Emergency 
readmission 
Emergency 
readmission 
Emergency 
readmission 
Emergency 
readmission 
Emergency 
readmission 
Emergency 
readmission  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
OLS with 
HRGs only 
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Private -0.0095*** -0.0070*** 0.0028 0.0028 0.0044 0.0030  
(-8.9607) (-7.3660) (1.2956) (1.2935) (0.8286) (0.6589)        
R2 0.0129 0.0303 0.0299 0.0299 0.0298 0.0299 
IV 1st stage choice of provider    
Private Private Private Private  
  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
dNHS  dP  0.0021*** 
   
   
(6.9783) 
   
dNHS 
   
0.0060*** 
  
    
(5.6921) 
  
dP 
   
-0.0021*** 
  
    
(-6.9979) 
  
       
(dNHS  dP)/min{dNHS,dP} 
  
0.0009*** 
 
     
(7.3771) 
 
dNHS/ min{dNHS,dP} 
   
0.0029***       
(9.6772) 
dP/ min{dNHS,dP} 
   
-0.0008***     
(-7.2841) 
1st stage F-stat 48.70 29.50 54.42 61.21 
Endogeneity Test Chi2 10.95 10.96 3.84 4.07 
Endogeneity Test p-value 0.0009 0.0009 0.0501 0.0436 
Sargan-Hansen Overidentif. Test Chi2  0.0058  0.2936 
Sargan-Hansen Test p-value  0.9392  0.5879 
Patients 3,784,683 3,784,683 3,784,683 3,784,683 
HRGs 133 133 133 133 
Notes. All models include 133 HRG effects and all except model (1) include age in bands (0-20/21-40/41-60/61-80/over 80), gender, 
number of Elixhauser comorbidities, number of emergency hospital admissions in the previous year, quality of ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ'WŝŶ ?012, 
ƌƵƌĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚ/DŝŶĐŽŵĞĚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚŝŽŶƐĐŽƌĞŽĨ>^KŽĨƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐĞ, indicator for day-case patients, distance from the centroid 
ŽĨƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐĞ>^KƚŽƚŚĞĐůŽƐĞƐƚŐĞŶĞƌĂůE,^ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?ĚNHS: patient distance to nearest NHS hospital, dP: patient distance 
to nearest private hospital. Distances procedure specific. t-stats in parenthesis based on cluster-robust standard errors at HRG level; 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
                                                 
21 With two distance-based instruments, either absolute (column (4)) or proportionate (column (6)), the Sargan-Hansen 
(Sargan 1988; Hansen 1982) over-identification test fails to reject the validity of the IVs.   
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The results in Table 3 are from models estimated on the matched sample. OLS and 2SLS results are 
very similar to those estimated on the unmatched sample: the OLS estimates suggest a large and 
statistically significant reduction in readmission risk for patients in private providers but the 2SLS 
estimates indicate a higher, though statistically significant, risk for patients in private providers. The 
first stage F-statistic on the excluded instrument (differential distance) is very large (240). The Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test rejects the null of the exogeneity of hospital type (p = 0.004) and the OLS estimated 
effect is outside the 2SLS 99% confidence interval [0.0038, 0.0092].  
 
Table 3. Effect of ownership on quality, matched sample 
  Emergency 
readmission 
Emergency 
readmission 
Emergency 
readmission  
(1) (2) (3) 
  OLS with HRGs 
& no case-mix 
controls 
OLS with HRGs 
& case-mix 
controls 
2SLS with HRGs 
& case-mix 
controls 
Private  -0.0066*** -0.0072*** 0.0027  
(-6.8278) (-7.6404) (1.0739) 
R2 0.0120 0.0197 0.0192 
IV 1st stage choice of provider 
   Private 
dNHS  dP   0.0030*** 
1st stage F-stat   239.9045 
Endogeneity Test Chi2 
  
8.2524 
Endogeneity Test p-value 
  
0.0041 
Patients 3,481,173 3,481,173 3,481,173 
Number of HRGs 133 133 133 
Notes. Sample selected by Coarsened Exact Matching.  dNHS patient distance to nearest NHS hospital. dP distance to nearest 
private hospital.  Controls and HRG effects as for Table 2 columns (2) and (3). t-stats in parenthesis based on cluster-robust 
standard errors at HRG level; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Table 4 compares private non-treatment centres, private treatment centres, and NHS treatment 
centres against NHS non-treatment centres. The OLS model suggests that quality is higher for patients 
by both types of private providers compared with NHS non-treatment centres. There is also a small 
reduction in readmission probability  ?AL ? ? ? ? ? ? ) in NHS treatment centres, though the coefficient is 
statistically significant only at 10%. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the null of exogeneity of the 
hospital types at 5%.  
 
Compared to OLS, the 2SLS coefficient on private non-ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚĐĞŶƚƌĞŝƐŐƌĞĂƚůǇƌĞĚƵĐĞĚ ?ƚŽAL ? ? ? ? ? ? )
and statistically insignificant. The coefficient on private treatment centre type changes sign to positive 
and is also statistically insignificant. The coefficient on the NHS treatment centre indicator also 
changes sign and suggests an increase in the emergency readmission probability of 0.018 compared 
with NHS non-treatment centres. Since the overall NHS mean readmission probability of 0.026, the 
effect of NHS non-treatment centres seems very large. However, we cannot reject at the 5% level the 
null hypothesis that the 2SLS estimates of the effects of NHS treatment centres and private treatment 
centres on readmissions are equal. Nor can we reject the null that the effects of private providers 
(both private ISTC and private non-TC) and NHS treatment centres are equal to zero. 
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Table 4. Effect of ownership and specialization on emergency readmission probability 
  Emergency 
readmission 
Emergency 
readmission 
   
 
(1) (2)    
  OLS 2SLS    
Private non-TC -0.0091*** -0.0005 
   
 
(-8.2160) (-0.1100) 
   
Private TC -0.0048*** 0.0042 
   
 
(-5.8462) (1.5860) 
   
NHS TC -0.0014* 0.0184** 
   
 
(-1.8482) (2.4730) 
   
1st stage choice of provider type     
   Private 
non-TC 
Private TC NHS TC 
dNHSnonTC  dPnonTC   0.0011*** -0.0007*** -0.0001*** 
   (7.1424) (-4.5836) (-3.2424) 
dNHSnonTC  dISTC   -0.0002* 0.0018*** -0.0001 
   (-1.9736) (8.5846) (-1.2166) 
dNHSnonTC  dNHS TC   -0.0001*** -0.0002*** 0.0003*** 
   (-6.1326) (-4.9433) (11.3331) 
R2 0.0303 0.0175 0.0387 0.0535 0.0300 
1st stage F-stat - private non-TC 
 
 20.77 
  
1st stage F-stat  ? private TC    35.73  
1st stage F-stat - NHS TC 
 
 
  
85.66 
Endogeneity Test Chi2 stat. 
 
8.74 
   
Endogeneity Test p-value 
 
0.0330 
   
Wald Test p-value: private non-TC = private TC 0.0000 0.2950    
Wald Test p-value: private non-TC = NHSTC 0.0000 0.0207    
Wald Test p-value: private TC = NHS TC 0.0000 0.0526    
Wald Test p-value: private non-
TC=ISTC=NHSTC=0 
0.0000 0.0516    
Notes. Covariates, HRG effects, and sample size as in Table 2, columns (2) and (3).  dNHSnonTC patient distance to nearest NHS 
non TC, dPnonTC  patient distance to nearest private non TC, dNHSTC patient distance to nearest NHS TC.   t-stats in parenthesis 
based on cluster-robust standard errors at HRGs level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
As there are only 6 NHS TCs and they may not be properly captured in Hospital Episode Statistics, we 
re-ran the models after combining NHS TCs and NHS non-TCs into a single NHS type. The OLS and 2SLS 
results (Appendix Table A3) for private non-TCs are similar to those in Table 4. For the private TCs, the 
2SLS results indicate a lower quality than NHS hospitals at 5% level. However, we cannot reject at the 
5% level the null that the quality of private treatment centres and private non-treatment centres are 
equal to each other and to the baseline NHS type.   
 
Table 5 compares FP and NFP private providers with NHS providers.22 The OLS estimates suggest that 
both types of private hospitals have higher quality than NHS providers. However, in the 2SLS model 
the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the null of the exogeneity of private hospital types (p = 0.0073) 
and the instruments are not weak according to the Stock and Yogo (2005) test based on a desired 2SLS 
maximal size set at 10% (the critical value with two endogenous regressors is 7.03). The 2SLS estimates 
of the effect of private FP and private FP status relative to public providers are not statistically 
significant. Both OLS and 2SLS models reject the null hypothesis that private FP and private NFP 
hospitals have the same quality.  
                                                 
22 tĞĞǆĐůƵĚĞ,Z'ƌŽŽƚ ? ? ? ‘>ĞŶƐĂƉƐƵůŽƚŽŵǇ ? )ĨƌŽŵƚŚŝƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĂƐŝƚǁĂƐŶŽƚŽĨĨĞƌĞĚŝŶĂŶǇƉƌŝǀĂƚĞE&WƐŝƚĞ ?/ŶǇĞĂƌ
2013/14 there were 25 ISP organisations in total (19 FP, 6 NFP), treating planned NHS-funded patients.   The private NFP and 
FP organisations owned 32 and 157 hospital sites respectively.   
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Table 5. Effect of ownership and for-profit status on emergency readmission probability 
  Emergency 
readmission 
Emergency 
readmission 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) 
 
 
 
  OLS 2SLS 
 
 
 
Private Not For Profit  -0.0083*** -0.0004 
 
 
 
 
(-4.3489) (-0.0399) 
 
 
 
Private For Profit  -0.0069*** 0.0034 
 
 
 
  (-7.7823) (1.3862) 
 
 
 
1st stage choice of provider type 
   
 
 
   
Private NFP  Private FP 
dNHS  ?dP_NFP   0.0002***  -0.0002*** 
    (5.1968)  (-3.6787) 
dNHS  ?dP_FP   -0.0002***  0.0021*** 
   (-4.0715)  (7.2403) 
Patients 3,773,129 3,773,129 3,773,129  3,773,129 
Number of HRGs 132 132 132  132 
R2 0.0303 0.0176 0.0752  0.0224 
1st stage F-stat  ? private NFP   14.29   
1st stage F-stat  ? private FP      26.22 
Endogeneity Test Chi2 stat. 
 
9.84 
 
 
 
Endogeneity Test p-value 
 
0.0073 
 
 
 
FP=NFP F-test p-value 0.3031 0.7168 
 
 
 
Notes. Models include 132 HRG effects. Covariates as in Table 2 columns (2) and (3).  dNHS = patient distance to nearest NHS 
hospital site, dP_NFP  patient distance to nearest not-for-profit ISP hospital site, dP_FP  patient distance to nearest private for-
profit  hospital site.  t-stats in parenthesis based on cluster-robust standard errors at HRG level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01.  
 
Table 6. Effect of ownership on quality, controlling for competition 
 
Emergency 
readmission 
Emergency 
readmission  
(1) (2)  
OLS 2SLS 
Private provider -0.0070*** 0.0026  
(-7.4502) (1.4589) 
Number of rival hospital sites within 30km -0.0000 0.0000  
(-0.7344) (0.2297) 
1st stage choice of provider type   
dNHS  ?dP 
 
0.0024***   
(7.2000) 
Number of rival hospital sites within 30km  -0.0010*** 
  (-13.6974) 
Patients 3,784,683 3,784,683 
Number of HRGs 133 133 
R2 0.0303 0.0299 
1st stage F-stat 
 
51.84 
Endogeneity Test Chi2 stat. 
 
15.65 
Endogeneity Test Chi2 stat. p-value 
 
0.0001 
Notes.  Same sample, other controls and HRG effects as in columns (2) and (3) of Table 2. In 2013/14, NHS and private 
hospitals had mean (sd) numbers of rival sites within 30km of 31 (30.5) and 23.6 (22.9). t-stats in parenthesis based on 
cluster-robust standard errors at HRG level; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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In Table 6 we report results from a robustness check in which we include a measure of market 
structure as a covariate to pick up any potential effects of competition on quality. Including the market 
structure measure has little effect: the direct effect of competition on quality is statistically significant 
in both the OLS and 2SLS models, and the OLS and 2SLS estimates of the effect of ownership are very 
similar to those in the preferred model in column (3) of Table 2. 
 
Table 7 reports results from five pairs of models estimated on dichotomous sub-samples defined by 
patient characteristics. The left hand model in each panel is estimated on the sub-sample which we 
would expect to have a lower risk of emergency readmission and the right hand part on patients likely 
to have higher risk. We see that dichotomising the sample by low versus high morbidity (no versus 
some previous emergency admissions in panel a, no versus some comorbidities in panel b), does not 
change the results reported in Table 2. The OLS estimates of the effect of ownership are biased in 
favour of private providers but the 2SLS estimates show no significant effect.   
 
In panel c the subsampůĞƐĂƌĞĚĞĨŝŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞŝŶĐŽŵĞĚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚŝŽŶƋƵŝŶƚŝůĞŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƐŵĂůůĂƌĞĂ
of residence (least deprived quintile versus four most deprived quintiles). For patients in the least 
deprived quintile we can no longer reject the null hypothesis that provider type is exogenous and so 
the OLS estimate is preferred. For patients in the more deprived quintiles the 2SLS model is preferred. 
Panel d implies that private providers have better quality relative to public providers for the least 
deprived patients and possibly worse quality for the most deprived. We get qualitatively similar results 
in panel d where the sample is dichotomised by age:  we cannot reject endogeneity of hospital type 
for younger patients. The OLS estimates for younger patients and the 2SLS estimates for older patients 
indicate that treatment in a private provider is better for younger patients and worse for older 
patients. Panel e dichotomises by type of HRG (diagnostic with a mean readmission rate of 1.88% vs 
non-diagnostic with a mean readmission rate of 2.17%). Again, like panels c and d, we cannot reject 
the null of exogeneity for the patients with a lower average readmission rate and private providers 
are better for the patients with diagnostic HRGs and worse for those with non-diagnostic HRGs.   
 
Notice that in all five dichotomisations the F statistic on the differential distance instrument is 
considerable smaller, though always statistically significant, in the models estimated on the right hand 
subsamples which have higher emergency readmission rates, suggesting that unobserved selection by 
providers is greater for these patients.    
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Table 7. Heterogeneity of ownership effect of based on observablĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ 
    Emergency 
readmission 
Emergency 
readmission 
Emergency 
readmission 
Emergency 
readmission  
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  
  OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
a. Effect of ownership by severity proxy (past emergency in the previous year)  
  Past emergency admission = 0 Past emergency admission > 0 
Private provider   -0.0070*** 0.0013 -0.0090*** 0.0205 
    (-7.23) (0.64) (-6.30) (1.44) 
IV 1st stage choice of provider   
    
dNHS - dISP   
 
0.0022*** 
 
0.0012***  
  
 
(7.03) 
 
(6.22) 
Patients   3,202,451 3,202,451 582,232 582,232 
1st stage F-stat   
 
49.44 
 
38.67 
Endogeneity Test p-value   
 
0.0021 
 
0.0341 
b. Effect of ownership by comorbidies included in the Elixhauser index.  
  Elixhauser comorbidities = 0 Elixhauser comorbidities > 0 
Private provider   -0.0055*** 0.0014 -0.0087*** 0.0044 
    (-6.94) (0.69) (-7.01) (1.35) 
IV 1st stage choice of provider   
    
dNHS - dISP   
 
0.0021*** 
 
0.0020***  
  
 
(8.84) 
 
(4.72) 
Patients   2,161,662 2,161,662 1,623,021 1,623,021 
1st stage F-stat   
 
78.07 
 
22.23 
Endogeneity Test p-value   
 
0.0035 
 
0.0050 
c. Effect of ownership by Income Deprivation Quintiles   
  Least deprived quintile 4 most deprived quintiles 
Private provider   -0.0065*** -0.0027 -0.0072*** 0.0043* 
    (-7.24) (-0.72) (-7.19) (1.80) 
IV 1st stage choice of provider   
    
dNHS - dISP   
 
0.0030*** 
 
0.0019***  
  
 
(7.47) 
 
(6.77) 
Patients   722,061 722,061 3,062,622 3,062,622 
1st stage F-stat   
 
55.79 
 
45.90 
Endogeneity Test p-value   
 
0.3480 
 
0.0004 
d Effect of ownership by Age   
  Age <= median age (59 years) Age > median age (59 years) 
Private provider   -0.0073*** -0.0034 -0.0068*** 0.0095*** 
    (-7.96) (-1.24) (-5.28) (3.08) 
IV 1st stage choice of provider   
    
dNHS - dISP   
 
0.0021*** 
 
0.0020***  
  
 
(8.22) 
 
(4.36) 
Patients   1,876,280 1,876,280 1,908,403 1,908,403 
1st stage F-stat   
 
67.50 
 
18.98 
Endogeneity Test p-value   
 
0.1827 
 
0.0009 
e. Effect of ownership ʹ by HRG type (non-diagnostic vs diagnostic)  
  Diagnostic HRGs Non-diagnostic HRGs 
Private provider   -0.0030*** -0.0044 -0.0079*** 0.0044** 
    (-4.03) (-0.71) (-7.08) (2.01) 
IV 1st stage choice of provider   
    
dNHS - dISP   
 
0.0022*** 
 
0.0020***  
  
 
(14.15) 
 
(5.89) 
Patients   1,127,586 1,127,586 2,657,097 2,657,097 
1st stage F-stat   
 
200.11 
 
34.66 
Endogeneity Test p-value   
 
0.8115 
 
0.0003 
Notes. Controls for confounding as in Table 2. Number of HRGs is 133 for panels a to d, and in panel e 14 HRGs are diagnostic and 
119 are non-diagnostic. t-stats in parenthesis based on cluster-robust standard errors at HRGs level; *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 8 reports results from a more detailed investigation of how the effect of ownership on quality 
differs by treatment type. We estimated separate models for the 15 HRGs with the largest number of 
patients treated in private hospitals.23 The 15 HRGs are for 2,123,479 patients, more than half of the 
full sample. The results fall into three groups: 
 
(i) Five HRGs (Major & Intermediate Knee Procedures for Non-Trauma, Phacoemulsification Cataract 
Extraction and Lens Implant, Inguinal, Umbilical or Femoral Hernia Procedures, Major & intermediate 
Hip Procedures for Non-Trauma and Minor Anal Procedures for 688,872 patients) have results similar 
to those for all procedures in Tables 2 and 3. They have negative and statistically significant OLS 
coefficients for treatment in a private hospital but the 2SLS coefficients on hospital type are smaller 
and are not statistically significant. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests reject the null of exogenous 
hospital and the first stage F-statistics on the differential distance instrument are very large.  
 
(ii) Four HRGs (Diagnostic Colonoscopy, Major Pain Procedures, Pain Radiofrequency Treatments, 
Diagnostic Flexible Cystoscopy) covering 525,297 patients have statistically insignificant effects of 
ownership in both OLS and 2SLS specifications, and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests do not reject the 
null of exogenous hospital type. 
 
(iii) Six HRGs (Diagnostic Endoscopic Upper Gastrointestinal Tract Procedures, Minor Hand Procedures 
for Non-Trauma, Major & Intermediate Shoulder  or Upper Arm Procedures for Non-Trauma, 
Diagnostic Flexible Sigmoidoscopy, Minor Skin Procedures, Intermediate Foot Procedures for Non-
Trauma) covering 909,310 patients have negative and statistically significant effects of private 
ownership with OLS but statistically insignificant effects with 2SLS. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test does 
not reject the exogeneity of hospital ownership. Hence the OLS estimates are valid and for this set of 
HRGs patients treated in private hospitals have a lower probability of emergency readmissions.  
 
  
                                                 
23 ^ŽŵĞ,Z'ƐĨŽƌƐŝŵŝůĂƌƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ ?Ğ ?Ő ? ‘DĂũŽƌ ?/ŶƚĞƌŵĞĚŝĂƚ <ŶĞĞWƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐĨŽƌEŽŶ-dƌĂƵŵĂ ?Žƌ ‘WŚĂĐŽĞŵƵůƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
ĂƚĂƌĂĐƚǆƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ>ĞŶƐ/ŵƉůĂŶƚ ? )ĂƌĞďƵŶĚůĞĚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ? 
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Table 8. Effect of ownership on quality by procedure 
  
 
Private providers 
 
NHS  providers 
 
Effect of private ownership First stage 
Procedures HRG root 
codes 
Patients 28-day 
emergency 
readmission 
rate 
 
Patients 28-day 
emergency 
readmission 
rate 
 
OLS 
estimate  
(t-stat) 
2SLS 
estimate 
(t-stat) 
Endogeneity 
test 
(p-value) 
1st Stage 
F-stat 
Effect of IV on 
choice of 
private 
hospital 
  
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9)              
(a) Major & Intermediate Knee 
Procedures for Non-Trauma 
HB21, HB22, 
HB23 
48,095 1.534% 
 
144,892 2.989% 
 
-0.0127***        
(-17.67) 
0.0043      
(0.74) 
8.6373***          
(0.00) 
6383.1 0.0065***          
(79.89) 
(b) Phacoemulsification Cataract 
Extraction and Lens Implant 
BZ02, BZ03 38,862 0.952% 
 
274,157 1.482% 
 
-0.0033***          
(-5.55) 
0.0051*          
(1.72) 
8.2047***          
(0.00) 
21584.6 0.0047***          
(146.92) 
(c) Diagnostic Endoscopic Upper 
Gastrointestinal Tract Procedures 
FZ61, FZ60 25,476 0.993% 
 
418,758 2.127% 
 
-0.0041***          
(-6.11) 
-0.0141*          
(-1.87) 
1.7909      
(0.18) 
11912.7 0.0023***          
(109.15) 
(d) Inguinal, Umbilical or Femoral 
Hernia Procedures 
FZ18 17,030 1.491% 
 
66,286 3.581% 
 
-0.0174***          
(-14.63) 
0.0084      
(1.10) 
11.4934***          
(0.00) 
4856.1 0.0065***          
(69.69) 
(e) Diagnostic Colonoscopy FZ51, FZ52 16,871 0.984% 
 
266,114 1.385% 
 
-0.0008      
(-1.03) 
0.0033      
(0.40) 
0.2529      
(0.62) 
6572.8 0.0024***          
(81.07) 
(f) Major & Intermediate Hip 
Procedures for Non-Trauma 
HB11, HB12, 
HB13 
16,227 3.186% 
 
54,097 4.475% 
 
-0.0077***          
(-4.62) 
0.0154      
(1.42) 
4.6099***          
(0.03) 
2521.1 0.0061***          
(50.21) 
(g) Minor Hand Procedures for 
Non-Trauma 
HB55, HB56 12,988 0.554% 
 
60,978 0.987% 
 
-0.0035***          
(-4.31) 
-0.0034      
(-0.66) 
0.0008      
(0.98) 
3957.4 0.0058***          
(62.91) 
(h) Major Pain Procedures AB04 12,675 1.262% 
 
87,246 1.474% 
 
-0.0007      
(-0.62) 
0.0004      
(0.04) 
0.0138      
(0.91) 
1677.2 0.0029***          
(40.95) 
(i) Major & Intermediate Shoulder  
or Upper Arm Procedures for 
Non-Trauma 
HB61, HB62 11,160 0.824% 
 
45,092 1.333% 
 
-0.0043***          
(-4.15) 
-0.0068      
(-0.79) 
0.0820      
(0.77) 
2015.3 0.0060***                
(44.89) 
(j) Diagnostic Flexible 
Sigmoidoscopy 
FZ54, FZ55 10,007 1.009% 
 
158,579 1.764% 
 
-0.0031***          
(-2.75) 
-0.0025      
(-0.21) 
0.0027      
(0.96) 
5008.4 0.0020***          
(70.77) 
(k) Minor Skin Procedures JC43 9,596 0.573% 
 
116,668 1.146% 
 
-0.0045***          
(-4.82) 
0.0064      
(0.61) 
1.0772      
(0.30) 
3262.0 0.0023***          
(57.11) 
(l) Intermediate Foot Procedures 
for Non-Trauma 
HB33, HB32 8,133 0.898% 
 
31,875 1.785% 
 
-0.0057***          
(-4.50) 
-0.0144      
(-1.42) 
0.7416      
(0.39) 
2300.1 0.0053***          
(47.96) 
(m) Pain Radiofrequency 
Treatments 
AB08 6,007 1.415% 
 
13,290 1.467% 
 
-0.0006      
(-0.30) 
-0.0045      
(-0.22) 
0.0366      
(0.85) 
169.0 0.0029***          
(13.00) 
(n) Diagnostic Flexible Cystoscopy LB72 5,699 1.509% 
 
117,395 2.141% 
 
-0.0012      
(-0.72) 
0.0153      
(0.97) 
1.1217      
(0.29) 
3551.2 0.0017***          
(59.59) 
(o) Minor Anal Procedures FZ23 5,455 1.155% 
 
23,771 2.238% 
 
-0.0094***          
(-5.12) 
0.0187*          
(1.92) 
8.3899***          
(0.00) 
1766.5 0.0071***          
(42.03) 
Notes. Controls for confounding as in Table 1 (excluding HRG dummies). t-stats based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors; IV: patient distance to nearest NHS provider minus patient distance to nearest 
private provider. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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5 Conclusions  
In the English NHS publicly funded patients have historically been treated almost entirely in public 
hospitals. More recently private providers have been allowed to enter the market and to treat NHS 
patients, with the primary aim of reducing waiting times for planned treatments by increasing capacity 
(Cooper et al, 2016).  
 
We have investigated the effect of being treated in private and public hospitals on one important 
aspect of the quality of care for publicly funded patients undergoing planned treatment  W whether the 
patient subsequently had an emergency readmission within 28 days of discharge from their initial 
treatment. We use data on 133 different planned treatments undergone by 3.8 million publicly-
funded patients in England between April 2013 and February 2014. We find that, on average over all 
treatments studied, private hospitals and public hospitals provide similar quality of care once case-
mix and patient self-selection into hospital types is adequately controlled for via instrumental variable 
regression. Simple case-mix adjustment based on observed patient characteristics alone provides 
biased estimates of quality differences that suggest that private providers have higher quality for 
publicly funded patients. We also find no quality differences between public and private specialised 
and non-specialised providers. Nor does quality in private providers depend on whether they are for 
profit or not profit. There are however statistically and economically significant differences in quality 
between public and private providers for specific types of care. For example, public providers have 
higher quality overall for non-diagnostic treatments whilst private providers do better overall for 
diagnostic treatments. We find no difference in quality between public and private providers for four 
of the five non-diagnostic treatments with the largest proportion of patients in private providers.  
 
Evaluating the opening of the market to private hospitals requires consideration of the effects on the 
quality of care for NHS patients as well as on waiting times and the cost to taxpayers who fund the 
NHS. We have not considered the effect on waiting times, nor have we investigated whether the costs 
of subsequent emergency readmissions differ for patients first treated in the private and public 
sectors. Our estimate of the quality effects of public versus private hospitals are based on data from 
a period in which private treatment of NHS patients is relevant but still limited. If private providers 
gain market share their incentives may change and they may engage in more rent extraction at the 
expense of quality. We have demonstrated in this paper how it will be possible to monitor quality even 
in the absence of complete information to adjust for casemix differences between public and private 
providers. 
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Appendix 
Table A1.  Numbers of sites and patients by hospital type 
 Sites Patients 
NHS providers 393 3,407,820 
NHS non-treatment centres 387 3,359,963 
NHS treatment centres 6 47,857 
   
Private providers 190 376,863 
Private non-treatment centres 148 202,152 
Private treatment centres 42 174,711 
Private for profit 157 335,132 
Private not for profit 32 41,731 
Notes.  Providers are hospital sites.  Ownership and for profit status is attached to the organisation that owns the sites.   
Numbers are from the estimation samples.  One HRG was dropped from the model with FP and NFP providers as it was not 
carried out in any NFP provider. 
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Table A2.  Effect of ownership on emergency readmission probability: full results 
  OLS IV First Stage 2SLS  
(1) (2) (3) 
  Emergency 
readmission 
Private provider Emergency 
readmission 
Private provider -0.0070*** 
 
0.0028  
(-7.3660) 
 
(1.2956) 
dNHS  dP 
 
0.0021*** 
 
  
 
(6.9783) 
 
dNHSnonTC -0.0001*** 0.0011*** -0.0001***  
(-3.1627) (5.4195) (-3.7077) 
GP QOF quality -0.0001*** 0.0004*** -0.0001***  
(-3.0940) (3.3683) (-3.2361) 
Patient living in rural area (LSOA) -0.0005** 0.0061*** -0.0004**  
(-2.2877) (2.6520) (-2.0341) 
Daycase patient -0.0102*** -0.0896*** -0.0093***  
(-9.9675) (-5.5145) (-8.7418) 
Female patient -0.0013*** 0.0030** -0.0013***  
(-3.3644) (2.0061) (-3.4212) 
Patient aged 0-19 years -0.0025 -0.0882*** -0.0017  
(-0.8906) (-7.8309) (-0.5977) 
Patient aged 20-39 years 0.0027** 0.0214*** 0.0024**  
(2.3042) (3.2166) (2.1408) 
Patient aged 40-59 years -0.0011** 0.0186*** -0.0012***  
(-2.3590) (5.7898) (-2.9206) 
Patient aged over 80 years 0.0103*** -0.0186*** 0.0105***  
(7.1923) (-6.0605) (7.2460) 
N. past year emergency admissions 0.0242*** -0.0156*** 0.0243***  
(35.7515) (-10.7951) (36.5689) 
Number of Elixhauser co-morbidities  0.0042*** -0.0039 0.0043***  
(16.2827) (-1.4704) (16.7363) 
IMD income deprivation score  0.0109*** -0.1325*** 0.0122***  
(9.2000) (-12.4959) (9.3523) 
Constant 0.0375*** 0.1063*** 0.0368*** 
  (21.5176) (4.6885) (22.0259) 
HRGs fixed effects YES YES YES 
Statistics 
   
Patients 3784683 3784683 3784683 
HRGs 133 133 133 
R2 0.0303 0.0819 0.0299 
1st stage F-stat 
  
48.6961 
1st stage F-stat p-value 
  
0.0000 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Endogeneity Test Chi^2 
  
10.9500 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Endogeneity Test p-value 
  
0.0009 
Notes. All models include 133 HRGs and; dNHSnonTC: ĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌŽŝĚŽĨƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐĞ>^KƚŽƚŚĞĐůŽƐĞƐƚ
general NHS hospital. dNHS: patient distance to nearest NHS hospital. dP: patient distance to nearest private provider. 
Distances computed to generate the instrumental variables are procedure specific. t-stats in parenthesis based on cluster-
robust standard errors at HRG level; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
  
28  CHE Research Paper 145 
 
Table A3. Effect of ownership and specialization on emergency readmission probability 
  Emergency 
readmission 
Emergency 
readmission 
  
 
(1) (2) 
  
  OLS 2SLS 
  
Private non-TC -0.0091*** 0.0022 
  
 
(-8.2411) (0.4928) 
  
Private TC -0.0047*** 0.0058** 
  
  (-5.8639) (2.1076) 
  
1st stage choice of provider type 
    
   
Private non-TC Private TC 
dNHS  ?dPnonTC 
  
0.0010*** -0.0008***    
(6.7730) (-5.2629) 
dNHS  ?dISTC 
  
-0.0002*** 0.0017*** 
  
  
(-2.6916) (8.8357) 
Patients 3784683 3784683 3784683 3784683 
Number of HRGs 133 133 133 133 
R2 0.0303 0.0374 0.0507 0.0175 
1st stage F-stat  ? Private non-TC   30.3505  
1st stage F-stat  ? ISTC    53.7565 
Endogeneity test Chi2 stat. 
   
8.6401 
Endogeneity test p-value 
   
0.0133 
Wald test p-value: Private non-TC = ISTC  0.0000 0.3996   
Wald test p-value: Private non-TC = ISTC 
= 0 
0.0000 0.0991   
Notes. Controls for confounding as in Table 4.  TC: treatment centre. dNHS = patient distance to nearest NHS hospital site, 
dPnonTC =  patient distance to nearest private non TC, dISTC = patient distance to nearest private TC hospital site.  t-stats in 
parenthesis based on cluster-robust standard errors at HRG level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
